Chris Bambery analyses Trump’s reasons for going to war in Iran

If you were to switch the question to Benjamin Netanyahu and Israel, the answer is obvious. They want to degrade Iran so that it can never stand up to Israel. That involves destroying its nuclear programme and its missile arsenal and the division of the country along the lines of Syria and Libya. 

But the Israeli media is openly worried that Trump will not stay the course.

At the outset it seemed Trump was set on regime change. On Saturday, Trump urged Iranians to “take back your government.”

Secretary of State for Defense (or War, as he prefers to be called), Pete Hegseth, speaking on Monday, rejected the idea that the US attacked Iran with the express goal of toppling the regime.

“This is not a so-called regime change war, but the regime sure did change,” Hegseth said during a news conference with General Dan Caine, chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Hegseth said Operation Epic Fury would be a success, but he did not offer details on the scope or duration of the conflict. His confidence contrasted with remarks by Gen Caine, who offered a more sober assessment. America’s military goals in Iran “will be difficult to achieve, and in some cases, will be difficult and gritty work,” Caine said. He also warned that the US could suffer further casualties as the war drags on.

“This operation is a clear, devastating, decisive mission: destroy the missile threat, destroy the Navy, no nukes,” Hegseth said. “This is not a so-called regime change war, but the regime sure did change, and the world is better off for it.”

Shortly after Trump laid out some of his objectives on Monday in his first public remarks at the White House since the start of the war.

The US is seeking to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and navy, its ability to develop nuclear weapons, and support for proxy groups in the region, Trump said. He argued the broader purpose of the war was to protect the US and its allies from attacks by Iran citing an “imminent threat” to the US. Administration officials said that the US acted in response to potential pre-emptive attacks by Iran on forces in the region — claims that were contradicted in Pentagon briefings to Capitol Hill that stated Iran was not planning to attack unless struck first. 

“An Iranian regime armed with long-range missiles and nuclear weapons would be an intolerable threat to the Middle East, but also to the American people,” Trump said.

He said the war was projected to last as long as “four to five weeks” but could also last “as long as it takes”.

“Whatever the time is, it’s OK. Whatever it takes,” Trump said.

The president added that the US needed to strike Iran now, without offering a detailed explanation as to why. “This was our last best chance to strike,” he said.

Later that day Trump said:

“Although the United States desires a quick and enduring peace, it is not possible at this time to know the full scope and duration of military operations that may be necessary,”

By that afternoon, Secretary of State Marco Rubio offered what appeared to be a new rationale: the US attacked Iran “pre-emptively” after learning Israel was going to strike, which would have in turn led to retaliation against US forces.

“We knew that if we didn’t preemptively go after them before they launched those attacks, we would suffer higher casualties,” Rubio told reporters on Capitol Hill before briefing top lawmakers.

An unclassified assessment from the Defense Intelligence Agency from 2025 said that Iran could develop a “militarily-viable” intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2035 “should Tehran decide to pursue the capability.”

There is no intelligence to suggest that Iran is pursuing an ICBM program to hit the US at this time, two sources told CNN.

Where does this leave the US’s war aims? 

It’s obvious that Iran’s air defences and command and control capability have not been taken out. US stealth bombers have dropped various 500-, 1,000- and 2,000-pound-class bombs. These seem to have targeted Iranian nuclear sites which were supposedly “obliterated,” Trump’s words, in June.

The vast majority of attacks on Iran are carried out by air-delivered weapons such as the AGM-154 Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW), Blue Sparrow-series air-launched ballistic missiles, sea-based Tomahawk-series missiles and the land-based Precision Strike Missile (PrSm). 

As in June, the Israeli airforce carries out its attacks from outside Iranian airspace. The aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is officially off the coast of Oman, meaning it’s not in the Persian Gulf. To attack into Iran, its planes would need to refuel mid-air, which is too dangerous to do at present.

The Tomahawks are fired from US destroyers but to re-arm they would need to sail to Diego Garcia (the facilities in Bahrain are too vulnerable). This is why Trump was so insistent Starmer allow use of the facilities there.

That brings me to the problem of US arms supply. This is not World War II, Korea or even Vietnam with mass production of weaponry. The degrading of this (and its much worse in Europe) means there are serious supply issues.

Trump wrote on his Truth Social website that the US munition stockpiles have “never been higher or better,” a day after the Wall Street Journal reported that the US was racing to destroy Iran’s missile and drone force before running out of interceptors:

“A major concern for the Pentagon is to maintain a sufficient stock of interceptors for the Thaad [anti-missile system], which U.S. forces also operate in South Korea and Guam, to deter North Korea and China.”

The newspaper goes on to report:

“The Pentagon is also racing to replenish stocks of Patriot and Standard Missile interceptors, which also take out aerial threats and are being used to defend against Iranian missiles and drones. Patriots take out lower-flying threats, while SM-3s can intercept ballistic missiles above the Earth’s atmosphere. Air-defense interceptors aren’t the only munitions that are in short supply. The U.S. is also expending sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, widely known as TLAMs, and aircraft-launched weapons against Iranian targets.”

This does not affect the US. The Gulf States have used up their missile defences dealing with initial Iranian missile and drone attacks. The danger is that they no more defences have used them to cope with attacks by older Iranian missile and drone attacks, leaving the Iranians with a potential open field.

The Israelis are busy claiming they are dealing with Iranian attacks but, unlike in July 2025, the Iranians are not concentrating on attacking there. The Iranians seem to be biding their time.

If the USA wants to destroy Iran’s nuclear fission programme – despite Teheran repeatedly pledging it does not wish to build a nuclear bomb – it is repeating what it did in June 2025, with little success then. Destroying Iran’s missile arsenal will not be easy as it is dispersed throughout the country.

This leaves the US to continue to hit civilian targets. This might provoke a popular uprising, but the history of aerial bombardment is that it either creates a dull apathy or it rallies support behind the regime.

So, despite claims that the war will last four or five weeks, it looks set – unless there is an insurrection in Iran – to last considerably longer. That will not play well on the US domestic front.