Chris Bambery interviewed the German left economist and writer, Wolfgang Streeck about the EU, the prospects of European involvement in the Ukraine War and political instability 

CB: The EU was, in many ways, disciplined by its Atlanticism. Loyalty to the USA helped hold it together. Without that, and despite current rhetoric, it now seems each member state will pursue its own self-interest. Do you agree? 

WS: Not really. The EU was not ‘disciplined by its Atlanticism’, as you put it, nor was it particularly disciplined in the first place. France always saw itself as a European hegemon-in-waiting, a leader of a more independent Europe midway between the United States and the East, for long the Soviet Union, and active globally as a third force in world politics. On this, it was in conflict, routinely kept under the lid by both sides, with Germany, which as a non-nuclear power had to rely on the United States for its national security. The other EU member states likewise pursued their national interests first – what else could a democratic country do? – the more so the larger and the more heterogeneous the EU became, having over the years grown from six to 27 members. With time, the internal politics of the EU rotated around two objectives: getting Germany to share its benefits from EU membership with the other member states, in this sense leading the EU as a benevolent hegemon; and keeping Germany as the strongest member from going it alone, in that sense promote ‘European integration’. The aim is keeping Germany in – not necessarily down, but bound by international legislation and majority voting – and prevent it from using its power to build a German zone of interest in which Germany has the freedom to act on its interest. 

CB: The idea the European states can send troops to Ukraine or even provide the necessary weaponry and munitions is a nonsense is it not? 

WS: Yes, they all know this, but nobody is willing to be the first to admit it. Right now, the idea seems to be to continue the war of attrition against Russia, more or less without American support, for three to five more years, giving EU members the necessary time to double or triple their ‘defence’ expenditure. By then, the hope is, Russia should be weakened enough, and the European armies re-armed enough, for a final deathblow. Again, Germany, now under Merz, will have to play the key role. The Scandinavian countries, the Baltics and Poland want Germany, by far the largest and richest continental member state, to supply the critical mass of conventional forces which they cannot themselves muster. Germany’s conventional forces are and will be comparatively well-funded because Germany, unlike France and the UK, does not have, or is not allowed to have, an expensive nuclear force. France and the UK will promise nuclear back-up for German ground troops in Ukraine, dressed up as ‘peace troops’, if needed. The new German government seems prepared to go along – ‘the Germans to the front’ – but they will probably want also American nuclear back-up – the question being can the UK and France be trusted to put London and Paris, respectively, at risk to protect Berlin? It seems more than doubtful, though, that the United States will commit itself seriously. 

CB: Across Europe, we see disillusionment with the established parties. Polls across Europe and in Ukraine show minority support for continuing the war. Here in the UK, Starmer is introducing austerity measures to help pay for increased military spending and aid to Ukraine. Surely, this can only fuel support for the far right? 

WS: I think the situation is more complex, more complicated. Right-wing opposition to the war can identify the far right with peace, yes, but it can also identify peace with the far right, which is what seems to be going on at present. The parties of the centre,  who try to stay in power by turning the new right into political and social outcasts, may find it easier to mobilise support for the war if they frame peace as the goal of a pro-Putin far right. At the same time, and vice versa, someone like Le Pen has become quite warlike and anti-Russian in her rhetoric, apparently to avoid being branded as an anti-French disloyal extremist. Incidentally, pressures for austerity have been around for some time before the war in Ukraine, due to the overhead costs of capitalism continuously and increasingly exceeding the taxes governments can collect from capital; I call this the financial crisis of the contemporary state. In this context, the war is just the latest opportunity for parties who have long lost the confidence of their voters to restore national unity and a willingness to sacrifice, and with it their declining capacity to govern, as indicated by the ever-growing share of public spending that now needs to be covered by borrowing from financial capital. If you are on the side of the good in a war against evil in which you or your brother, son, husband may have to sacrifice their lives, how could you possibly be so egoistic not to accept a cut in your pension for the sake of bringing the boys back home as soon as possible? 

CB: Is Russia a threat to Europe? 

WS: We are told in Germany that Russia will attack Western Europe in about five years, which is why we have to be kriegstüchtig (capable of going to war) before that. Allegedly, Russia is given to a strange addiction: conquering small neighbouring states, most of them non-Russian ethnically, and incorporating them into the Russian Federation, cost it what may – quite an expensive habit one should think. This is a country that has a hard time governing itself, one that has in three years been unable to conquer Ukraine, one of the poorest and least developed European countries, with a capital, Kiev, only 400 or so kilometres from the Russian border. Thinking more about the long term, why should a resource-rich country like Russia want to conquer other, technology-rich countries to whom it could sell its resources to pay for its modernisation and get rich in the process? Even Russia cannot eat its minerals one should think. Everybody who could read, knew well before 2014 that Russia could not live with the prospect of Ukraine joining Nato without an agreement on arms control on Ukrainian territory, and with the United States taking control of the Russian military harbour of Sebastopol on the Crimean Peninsula. With a settlement in Ukraine that satisfies Russian national-security interests, there would be no reason in the world why Russia should not be more than happy with a Eurasian economic zone ‘from Lisbon to Vladivostok’. 

CB: In the German elections, the AfD came second and Die Linke exceeded expectations. The AfD now support conscription and want to get nuclear missiles. Die Linke voted for the equivalent of war credits. Will that rebound on them? 

WS: The AfD has always been for conscription and it didn’t hurt them. Essentially, before the Zeitenwende, they sold it as an educational exercise to instil a manlier attitude in the next generation, making them readier for violence. Now they are being joined by the CDU-CSU. The Greens are trying to be in favour of conscription, but as a self-proclaimed feminist party, only for men, not for women. If this will fly in the Constitutional Court, I don’t know. As to nuclear arms, the legacy paper of the conservative-centrist elites, the FAZ, is slowly approaching the point when it will openly advocate for them. This is in a way only consequent. If Germany is to bear the main burden of a European-sponsored conventional land war in Ukraine it must be able, as a last resort, to prevent a possible defeat by threatening to attack Russian troops, military bases, and even cities with the most effective means of destruction available. It must also be able to deter a Russian nuclear threat in case of Russia being about to lose the conventional war. As to the public mood, don’t underestimate the power of war propaganda. Its tools are in good shape, having been continuously tested and improved – see Palestine, where the ongoing genocide is skilfully protected by the government and the media as well as prominent philosophers from being called what it is. It seems remarkably easy to convince the younger generation of today that the world is divided in good and evil and that it is our duty to fight evil even at the cost of thousands, if not millions, of human lives – for ‘justice’. Whether the Greens of today would have opposed the Vietnam War – one of the most senseless mass killings in human history – may well be asked. 

CB: Germany was the key force in the EU. Today its economy is in a bad way. The potential costs of this new military drive will be high economically and socially (my two boys are fifteen and seventeen and aren’t going to jump at joining up unlike both my mum and dad in World War II). How do you see this playing out in Germany? 

WS: This is hard to say. War hysteria was always a strong historical force. There is already talk here of putting your life on the line for your country giving it a higher meaning: dulce at decorum est pro patria mori, as the Romans had it (sweet and honourable it is to die for the fatherland). Apart from this, increasingly, wars can be fought with remote-controlled high technology on the one hand and highly trained professional soldiers on the ground on the other. According to recent press reports, there are already quite a few non-Ukrainian specialists fighting at the Ukrainian front, mostly from the US and the UK; one presumes they are very well paid. In Europe, the EU might also hire mercenaries from outside its core member states, perhaps from the Balkans. They could be offered something like European citizenship after a specified time of service, like in the Roman Empire of old. I think European governments will try hard to avoid having to draft their own citizens. As Ursula von der Leyen put it, ‘the Ukrainians are dying for our values’. Maybe others can be found to chip in and do the same? 

CB: My bet is that despite Starmer’s current rhetoric, the UK will revert to being Washington’s lap dog – it has assets the US values (five eyes, GCHQ, MI6 even). Do you agree? 

WS: I do. I don’t know how important the ‘assets’ you mention are for the Americans; they have assets on their own end, I should think. But this doesn’t mean that the Brits cannot be of use here and there. They can help out with their nuclear submarines (which however apparently aren’t operational without American support anyway), provide trained special forces for commando operations in the Middle East, help the US prevent a too close alliance between Germany and France etc. etc. I cannot see that the present Labour leadership has any idea of a UK national interest other than that it is identical with the US national interest. The only one who thought otherwise, and stood for it,  was Jeremy Corbyn, and you see what happened to him.