As the conflict in Iran and the wider region escalates, Chris Bambery, examines the emerging impact and repercussions on the Gulf States

The fact that Iran continues to launch coordinated missile attacks demonstrates that its command and control systems is still working. Despite the killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei and other commanders its military capability is not disorganised.

Iran is also calculating that it can pressure the Gulf States into demanding Trump calls off this war. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait and Oman have all be hit by Iranian missiles or drones. All house US bases.

Of course, the danger in this strategy is that Iran forces these states into joining the US attack but given their limited military capabilities that is, perhaps, something Iran is discounting.

Traditionally the Gulf States have depended upon first British and then US imperialism. Britain carved out the Gulf sultanates from the Ottoman Empire in the 19^th and early 20^th century to secure their control of the Gulf. Even before the discovery of oil they were deemed key to British control of the sea routes to India.

Saudi Arabia was created in 1932 by the House of Saud after a series of wars united

Hejaz, Najd, parts of Eastern Arabia and South Arabia (Asir) into a single state with the ultraconservative Wahhabi version of Islam as the state religion.

Initially allied to Britain it switched allegiance to the US in the dying days of World War Two after President Roosevelt out-bribed Churchill to buy their allegiance, guaranteeing constant arms supplies.

In recent years the politics of the Gulf states has seem set in stone. The US was the guarantor of their security, particular with Shi’a Iran with whom they were at daggers drawn. Despite divisions between them the Gulf states co-operated through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

Oil was the source of their wealth

In recent years that has changed, in part through the rise of China. It is the main customer now for Saudi and Iranian oil and in 2023 Beijing secured an agreement between Saudi and Iran. The Qataris and Oman have tried to be the honest broker between the US, Iran, Israel and Palestine, but have been repeatedly snubbed by Washington and Tel Aviv.

All the Gulf states are trying to diversify their economies away from dependence on oil, with very mixed results.

The GCC states rely on nearly 30 million foreign workers, constituting over half their total population (up to 90% in UAE and Qatar). Primarily from South Asia and Africa, they dominate construction, domestic, and service sectors. They cannot quit but the Western workers can and many will now.

The fact some 60,000 British citizens are in the area underlines its importance to the UK and is one more reason why Starmer is now allowing the US use of British military bases.

In this contest Iran is depending on the vulnerability of the Gulf States:

“The Gulf has more to lose economically than Iran… Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Doha have become global hubs for aviation, logistics, tourism, tech, real estate, and finance. All these sectors are vulnerable to disruption and reputational damage.”

So having tried to balance between Washington and Beijing the hour of choosing is at hand, and the Americans are very aware of this.

The room for manoeuvre is narrowing daily:

“Meanwhile, if US military engagement deepens but Washington’s political bandwidth narrows, Gulf states may find themselves in a complicated position – more dependent on American security support yet more cautious about relying on a single patron. That dynamic could produce a new pattern, something like conditional alignment, where Gulf capitals cooperate militarily with the US but widen their economic and diplomatic options to avoid over-dependence.”

Because they are still so reliant on oil exports any disruption to flows through the Straits of Hormuz would prove disastrous for these states.

They did not want this war, but these states are home to eight permanent US bases and 11 other military sites. The US Central Command (CENTCOM), which directs military operations from Egypt to Kazakhstan, is headquartered in Florida and operates a forward headquarters at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, its largest military installation in the Middle East, home to 10,000 US troops.

The US Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based in Bahrain.

In Saudi Arabia the Prince Sultan Air Base hosts the 378th Air Expeditionary Wing, a USAF unit of approximately 2,200 airmen and soldiers assigned to PSAB, as well as the U.S. Army’s Patriot missile defence capability and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) capability in the region.

The White House in June 2024 said that over 2,300 US military personnel were stationed in Saudi Arabia, with the majority at the air base.

In terms of being a guarantor of Saudi and the Gulf States security the US is the only game in town, and it is very aware of that. Trump will want to use this to get them to break links with China but in the medium to longer term those states are also aware of China’s rise.

What is not addressed is the internal dangers these states face. Almost all have Shi’a minorities which are closely policed. However in Bahrain they are a majority, historically oppressed by the Sunni House of Khalifa.

During the Arab Spring the Khalifa dynasty was rocked to its core and it required a Saudi invasion to restore “order.”

What’s not clear is how much Jihadist beliefs resonate. Theologically there is little that differs them from Wahhabism, but politically they are at daggers drawn. In Saudi the Jihadists reject the Saudi kingdom seeking a Muslim wide Caliphate and utterly reject its links to the West.

The underlying point is that these are not deep rooted nation states with a strong sense of nationalism. Rather they are based on clan ties. They are, therefore, more brittle faced with a long war.

Saudi and the Gulf States did not want this war, but it has come and it poses questions their rulers would rather not answer, but they must.