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The new generation of Chinese leaders will not have it all their own way, as the Chinese workers’ movement is on the rise, says Sean Ledwith

Chinese people protest against petrochemical plant On 6th November, the world's dominant superpower holds its Presidential election. Two days later, its main rival for that title begins the process of selecting the nine men who will lead it for the next generation. The US President is often labelled the Most Powerful Man in the World, but the men who will form the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party can plausibly claim to be the Nine Most Powerful Men in the World. This reality is what underlies the spectacle of Obama and Romney trading insults in the Presidential debates about who would be more likely to 'get tough with China'. According to many China watchers, the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party is expected to inaugurate the era of the 'princelings'-a clique made up of the sons of the 1949 generation, who are expected to oversee China’s replacement of the US on the global centre-stage.

China the Superpower?

According to IMF projections, this tectonic shift in the balance of the global economy is just four years away. The rise of China to its current position as the world's second- biggest economy is the most important geopolitical trend since the fall of the USSR in the 1990s. Its prodigious growth rates of 10% over the last decade have left leaders of other advanced states standing in awe and envy as their economies nosedived into recession from 2008.

China's ascent to quasi-superpower status has manifested itself in numerous ways. Consumers in Western high streets have witnessed their shops fill up with a ubiquitous array of commodities marked 'Made in China'. The luxury-item shops on those high streets have also seen an increasing number of Chinese shoppers jetting in to spend their newfound wealth. Numbers of Western educational institutions offering courses in Mandarin have reached record levels as the perception grows that it will be the language of business in the new century. American politicians have become increasingly paranoid about the 'dollar mountain' of US debt owned by China. The Beijing Olympics of four years ago were seen to mark China's announcement to the world that it was ready to assume the mantle of global leadership in the 21st century -‘China's century’. There has even been tentative talk that the next man on the Moon will be Chinese.

Yet there is another side to this giddy optimism. This year’s Communist Party Congress will open against a backdrop of an economic slowdown, faction fighting among the elite and increasing resistance from Chinese workers and peasants. When the President-designate Xiji Ping disappeared for two weeks this summer, the internet was buzzing with rumours of an internal coup. This reversal of fortune can only be understood if the trajectory of Chinese development is situated in historical context and China's current position in the integrated global economy is understood. In addition to these constraints, the princelings will increasingly be confronted by a foe of their own creation-the massive Chinese working class.

Integration with the West

The extent to which China and the West are interlocked was exposed spectacularly by the Bo Xilai scandal earlier this year-the most serious political rupture in the country for a generation. Bo was a rising star of the Communist Party and a year ago could have confidently expected to be promoted to the Standing Committee at the 18th Congress. One of the 'princelings', as party boss of the south west province of Chongqing he had established a reputation as a 'can do' regional fixer, cracking down on organised crime and using state funds to push growth. He first started to attract the suspicion of the party elite by reviving the populist mass singing and rallies associated with the Mao Zedong era. For the current elite, these techniques are an uneasy reminder of the political turbulence of the 1960s, when China appeared to be on the brink of internal disintegration.

Bo then came to the attention of the international media when his chief of police sought asylum in an American consulate last March. The dispute between the two men revolved around the suspicious circumstances of the death of British businessman, Neil Heywood, in November 2011. The subsequent trial led to the conviction for murder of Bo's wife and the swift termination of his own political aspirations. The scandal also exposed the playboy lifestyle of his son, who had injudiciously posted photos of his extra-curricular activities at Harvard University on Facebook. These aspects may make it seem a matter purely of the individual failings of a particular official, but Bo's fall from grace is also an outward sign of a factional battle within the ruling class over the speed and extent of China's integration with the global economy.

The relationship between the economies of China and the US has been described by the economist Fareed Zakaria1 as the 21st century equivalent of Mutually Assured Destruction (the military doctrine of nuclear deterrence that shaped the foreign policies of America and Russia in the second half of the 20th century). China has amassed a currency reserve of about $1 trillion, which periodically loans back to the US to sustain the latter's deficit spending. This in turn enables American consumers to continue buying the imported commodities from China that flow in massive quantities across the Pacific. The US spending spree reciprocally supports China's export-driven and low-wage economy.

This circle of dependency however is also at the root of China's inability to decouple itself from the global economy. It creates a break on its capacity to threaten the long-term economic hegemony of the US. The Chinese boom in export industries is founded on the joint pillars of underdeveloped domestic consumption and a notoriously exploitative system of sweatshop labour. The dilemma facing the Chinese ruling class is how to square this circle; how to cultivate a domestic middle class willing to save less and spend more, without loosening the iron grip on a working class that is becoming increasingly restless. The tensions attached to such a polarisation are obvious. China is home to a million dollar-millionaires, but also has 150 million people living on less than a dollar a day.

The elites are all too aware of how similar one-party states in Eastern Europe imploded in the 1990s after attempting marketisation. The 'Stalinism with a Coke' model, as John Rees describes it,2 has facilitated China's remarkable rise on the global stage but there is a risk inherent in maintaining totalitarian control of a state that is simultaneously seeking economic diversification. The factional strife in the upper echelons of the Chinese Communist Party on the speed of this process is the backdrop to the Bo Xilai scandal. The difficulty of the transition is also highlighted by the recent announcement the annual growth rate has slipped to 7%, still beyond the dreams of any Western economy but a downturn for China. The downsizing is another indication of China's inability to escape the impact of a recession of spending in the West.

The economic interdependency of the US and China should cool the paranoia that permeates sections of the Western ruling class about 'China's Century' and its imminent threat to their strategic interests. Books with titles such as 'When China Rules the World' and 'Bowing to Beijing' have become bestsellers and stirred up anxiety among politicians in Europe and the US. This hype is misplaced, not just because of the interlocking of the global economy but also because of the historical trajectory of the Chinese state over many centuries. As the world's oldest continuous civilisation, China's rulers have always prioritised internal control over external expansion. The current elite share the agenda of their imperial counterparts during the Tang and Song dynasties, the peaks of Chinese state power in the medieval era, to consolidate absolute power of the huge territory of the Chinese state and only cultivate foreign contacts in so far as they will assist that process. 'Hide brilliance, cherish obscurity' as former leader, Deng Xiaoping put it.

This sober reality debunks the notion that China could rival the US militarily or politically in terms of global outreach. The gap between the two is highlighted by China's recent purchase of its first aircraft carrier, a second hand one from Ukraine. In contrast the US already has 11 state-of-the-art models. It is true that China has proved a formidable block to America's agenda at the UN over issues such as the Syrian civil war and Iran's nuclear programme, but this points to a desire to thwart US strategic encirclement rather than a bid to supplant it in the global arena. Likewise, China's increasing investments in Africa and Latin America are motivated by the pursuit of cheap raw materials for its push for growth, not an attempt to construct an imperial counterweight to the US.

The Princelings and the Proletariat

The princelings in Beijing will be cautiously optimistic that they can supervise the upgrade of China's global status because they are heirs to the generation which in the late 1970s presided over an astounding 17-fold expansion in the size of the economy. Starting with Deng Xiaoping’s comment that 'it doesn’t matter if the cat is black or white so long as it catches mice' ,the ruling class in 1978 embarked on a risky but ultimately productive plan to marketise agricultural production, while retaining a tight grip of the political process. Breaking up state control of rural communes and allowing peasants to sell most of their produce on the open market contributed to what some observers have called the greatest improvement in living standards in world history.

The incoming elite will, however, also be aware that this strategy was not an unqualified success. The incentivisation in the countryside generated inflationary pressure in the wider economy that triggered protests and strikes in the big cities. This rising tide of unrest in the late 1980s culminated in the spectacular student-worker demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, Beijing in 1989 that brought the regime to the brink of collapse. For a few weeks in the summer of that year, many Chinese cities were filled with thousands of demonstrators waving red flags and singing the Internationale, not in a choreographed display of obedience to the elite, but explicitly calling for its overthrow. Eventually the regime deployed its iron fist and smashed the protests with shocking brutality, leading to an estimated 30,000 deaths across the country.

The current boom likewise has created huge opportunities for the ruling class but also has potentially brought its gravedigger onto the scene. The focus on an export driven, low wage economy has created a 150 million-strong proletariat, concentrated in huge workplaces such as the notorious Foxconn factory in northern China, which assembles parts for many Apple products. Working conditions in sites like this resemble Marx's descriptions in Volume 1 of Capital of the English factories of the 19th century. Workers are regimented in military-style barracks and infamously, the suicide rate has been so high that safety nets have been installed to thwart suicide attempts.

Like their counterparts in the 19th century, however, Chinese workers are fighting back. Last September a 'brawl' involving 2000 workers led to a temporary shutdown of the plant, and Foxconn has also been the site of strike action. 'They're more willing to stand up for their rights, to stand up to injustice' said a spokesman from the China Labour Bulletin.3 Significantly, the government has stopped publishing data concerning workers’ unrest, but according to a CLB report this year there were 90 000 ‘mass incidents’ in 2009, and the likelihood is that number has continued to rise since then. The report adds, ‘The younger generation of migrant workers has certainly breathed new life into the workers’ movement, making it more organised, confident and effective’

In the 1950s Tony Cliff pioneered a Marxist analysis of the modern Chinese state which remains valid despite the zig-zags of its successive generations of rulers and its Communist veneer.4 China is a state capitalist economy in which a bureaucratic ruling class has centralised control of a semi-feudal economy and completed the tasks of a bourgeois, nationalist revolution. There are certainly major differences between the economic strategy of the Chinese ruling class and its Western counterparts, but like all other capitalist classes in the world today they are confronting the contradictions created by trying to simultaneously drive down the working conditions of the majority while sustaining the rate of profit in a global recession. It is quite possible that the 21st century will be ‘China’s century’, but in a radically different way from that envisaged by the princelings.


1. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, 2nd ed., (New York 2011), p.124

2. John Rees, Imperialism and Resistance, (London 2006), p.58

3. A Decade of Change-The Workers’ Movement in China 2000-2010

4. Cliff, T, 1957. Mao Tse-Tung and Stalinism. Socialist Review, 135-142.


#1 Wrong method and wrong factsHeiko Khoo 2012-11-03 10:09
There is a clear problem with method and facts here. There is no explanation of growth except exploitation, which also exists in normal capitalism, the big question is why this abnormal 'capitalism', in your view, 'state capitalism', produces laws of motion that are radically different to those in 'normal capitalism'?
As regards facts:
The proletariat is far more numerous than 150 million about 400 million.
The figures for casualties of Tiananmen 1989 seem to be taken from the BBC and multiplied by 50 for unknown reasons.
Although farmers are allowed to lease land, the basic grain supplies are purchased by the state and the land is state owned.
Your final paragraph basically labels China as everything, except what it its. China abolished feudalism in 221BC.
It is clearly an economy dominated by industry.
Average wages are rising and have risen significantly for many years and this is encouraged by the state and ruling party.
The average rate of profit for the largest corporations is very very low, but this is irrelevant as they are state owned companies not driven by profits.
#2 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism sean ledwith 2012-11-04 23:03
Correct methods and correct facts

The last paragraph does not label China as 'everything'-it clearly classifies it as a state capitalist regime and its laws of motion are not radically different from other capitalist regimes-that is the point. As Cliff puts it in the article cited, 'The basic facts of the Stalinist regime are the subordination of consumption to the needs of quick capital accumulation, the bureaucratic management of industry, the limitation of workers’ legal rights, the enforced “collectivisation” of agriculture, the differentiation of society into privileged and pariahs and the totalitarian police ..' In other words the Chinese elite share the fundamental capitalist agenda of their Western counterparts but have greater access to state intervention as an economic tool-hence their ability to squeeze greater growth rates out of their workers

The figure of the Chinese proletariat as 150 million refers to the number of urban migrants in the export driven industries cited by David McNally in 'Global Slump' p52

The casualty figure for 1989 comes from Amnesty International press release 16 June 1989-not the BBC

If feudalism was abolished in China in 221 BC how can we explain the repeated peasant rebellions of Chinese history?-The Yellow Turban rebellion,the Red Turban rebellion,the White Lotus rebellion,the Taipeng rebellion etc -(or perhaps these were rebellions for the restoration of feudalism....?)

As for the idea that 'average wages are rising...and this is encouraged by the state and ruling party' it might be interesting to hear the response of Foxconn workers to this.
#3 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 00:11
If China is a state capitalist regime, then what is the difference between state capitalism under Mao and now?
It seems to me that there is a very clear difference between the laws of motion of the economy in China and those in the centers of world capitalism. i.e. since 2008 Western capitalism suffered from recession, i.e. negative growth, China meanwhile grew by over 40%.
Mc Nally is clearly confused, he says "perhaps 150 million have left the countryside" the figure if far far larger, but this has nothing to do with 150 million on less than $1 a day which is what you claimed.
On the same page 52 Mc Nally claims the proletariat in China is 750 million strong which is clearly an exaggeration, unless you count peasants as proletarians.
I have not found the Amnesty press release you refer to, but that was in 1989, no one nowadays accepts such wild figures, certainly not Amnesty itself. So why do you refer to such speculative figures 23 years after the event when a considerable body of research has debunked these numbers?
#4 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 00:17
As regards the feudalism issue, the idea that China was feudal after 221 BC was imposed on the Chinese Communist Party and the 3rd International under orders from Stalin in 1931. He had previously used the argument in 1926-7 to justify the submission of the CPC to the Guomingang.
It is not only feudalism that can face peasant revolts.
I refer you to a review article on the issues published on this website.
#5 Discovering "laws of motion"James Meadway 2012-11-05 11:18
[qoute]It seems to me that there is a very clear difference between the laws of motion of the economy in China and those in the centers of world capitalism. i.e. since 2008 Western capitalism suffered from recession, i.e. negative growth, China meanwhile grew by over 40%.

This is no evidence of "different laws of motion" from China's (presumably) non-capitalist economy. Or else we would presumably have to claim (for instance) India and Sri Lanka, which also had positive growth over 2008-10, were also non-capitalist.

China motoring through the crash is easily explicable by the mobilisation of fiscal stimulus on a collossal scale - some 16% of GDP pumped into the economy. This is simple Keynesianism, with the Chinese capitalism responding much as any other capitalism would. It is organised politically differently, of course - which is partly why such resources could be mobilised so rapidly - but there's precisely no reason to pretend that the central dynamic of the Chinese economy is anything other than competitive accumulation, exactly as in capitalism elsewhere.
#6 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism sean ledwith 2012-11-05 12:06
As Neil Faulkner observes in his Marxist History of the World part 25 on this website,imperial China is best classified as a 'mixed tributary-feudal' system. In other words,a variation on the feudalism in medieval Europe but feudalism nonetheless. To argue feudalism was abolished in 221 BC because the Emperor said so is to apply a 'wrong method'.
Heiko disputes the classification of today's China as state capitalist-should we call it 'socialist' therefore? If so,everyone on the left may as well pack their bags and go home.
#7 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 12:15
It might be argued, as James does, that other examples of reasonably rapid growth indicate similar laws of motion. I think the use of the example of India is valid, but Sri Lanka is not, due to obvious reasons. Comparison generally requires some commonality. The World Bank did this with the Growth Report 2008.
In terms of growth the period under consideration from 2008 is part of a long term process in China, such that the rate and scale is of an entirely different (arguably qualitatively different) character to India.
It is generally accepted, (World Bank, UNDP) that China's growth since 1978 has been the most rapid and sustained of any country in history.
The real improvements this has brought vastly surpass India and this is continuing -any assessment of the data reveals this.
If China is a capitalist country, (much like any other) and this is simple Keynsianism, and it works, (and nothing indicates that it does not work) then this is a form of capitalism that is able to avert the crises that capitalism suffers from elsewhere.
Although James says that competitive accumulation is the central motive force, it is unclear what this means. In China it is not competition that is driving state investment, but state planning, and party edicts, SOE corporate profits are a completely manufactured phenomena produced by state support.
e.g. if a state bank gives a loan to a state firm to build 10 million council flats that is hardly normal capitalism, and sounds instead a lot like like what would be normal in a non-capitalist planned economy.
This is not to deny massive capitalist exploitation in China, but it is to deny that it is the central and determining factor in the laws of motion of the Chinese economy.
#8 RE: China's Princelings of Capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 12:28
Sean, you have now changed your interpretation of Chinese 'feudalism' and incorporated the 'tributary mode of production' theory, which is good. But having adopted the idea that China was a "mixed' system for thousands of years you then interpret the present is an entirely black and white way. i.e. If China is not capitalist then it must be socialist.
There is a large body of Marxist theory on transitional society between capitalism and socialism packing this into a bag to read on holiday is better than packing bags.
Surely the advantage of the tributary theories (which were first applied to China by the Japanese Marxist Hayakawa Jiro) was that they revealed nuance based on facts rather than imposing categories on realities which don't fit?
#9 RE: China's princelings of capitalism James Meadway 2012-11-05 14:24
Heiko: the point about the India and Sri Lanka comparisons is that it is comparatively easy to find unarguably (presumably...?) capitalist countries that waltzed through the crash. Growth over the 2008-10 period cannot, then, be taken as evidence of China's non-capitalist dynamics.

Nor can its continual growth over the last 30 years or so. Yes, it is a sustained period of economic expansion; no, this is not wholly exceptional under capitalism - compare, for example, with western capitalism's post-war "Golden Age". (Not as quite dramatic as China's ascent in the more developed west, although see S.Korea's progress from the 1960s onwards for a similar movement from extreme poverty to middle-income status.)

There is, it is true, planning of a sort in China, but this fact alone does not make an economy non-capitalist. Capitalism contains great expanses of planning - most obviously within large corporations, but states themselves have attempted to plan against the competitive anarchy that prevails outside the zones of planning.

The decisive point is not plan vs. non-plan. It is to ask who controls the plan, and to what are they responding. In the case of China, successive five year plans have *always* been under the control of the bureaucracy, who have *always* - and of necessity - developed their plan as a response to the competitive pressures of the global order, both directly economic and militarily. That defines the dynamic of the plan, and the dynamic of the Chinese economy. It is capitalism, but it is capitalism in which the state has taken a leading role in the competitve process of accumulation.
#10 RE: China's princelings of capitalism sean ledwith 2012-11-05 14:33
Categorising imperial China as a tributary-feudal mode of production represents an amplification of my position,not a change. The original article is focused on China's current status therefore I did not wish to investigate at great length its historical development,hence my original use of the term 'feudal'. It is correct to say the later peasant uprisings such as the Taipeng and the Boxers were increasingly aimed at capitalist incursions by the West but their domestic focus was undoubtedly focused on overthrowing the vestiges of the feudal system that was perceived by the rebels to be acquiescent in colonisation.

It is also correct that is a substantial body of marxist analyses of 'transitional societies'-above all Cliff's pioneering work on Russia and China which is still valid for explaining how the current Chinese elite is pressurised by the global capitalist economy. The possibility of a mixed tributary-feudal system does not open the door to a possible mixed 'capitalist-socialist' system. To argue there is anything remotely socialist about modern China is to utterly undermine the credibility of the left as a force for the emancipation of the working class.
#11 RE: China's princelings of capitalism Haroun Lazim 2012-11-05 16:53
Just to note: I don't think anyone has actually, explicitly, claimed that China is socialist. Heiko has denied it is state capitalist, which I disagree with. But if we were not to accept the binary of either socialist or capitalist, how might we define China? 'Statist?' That doesn't seem a useful framework of analysis. I would suggest that there is a mixture of state capitalist institutions, as well as lesser but significant networks of capitalist ventures on sliding scales of legality.
#12 RE: China's princelings of capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 18:28
The defense of a method of thinking requires an ability to look at details and determine if they fit, amend or overthrow the theory.
I cannot see how a "state capitalist" theory a la Cliff, can be made to fit both Maoist China and the present system.
What supplementary qualifiers might help to capture reality from within your own framework (with which I disagree)?
It seems that James is saying China is 1. state capitalism a la Cliff, but also 2. Keynsian, but Sean claimed it has 3. a "centralized" and "semi-feudal economy": are all these three categories combined really helpful to an understanding of contemporary China?
Sean tells me that I am not allowed to say there is anything socialistic in China. I suggest it is better to discuss this rather than than make this a forbidden zone. For example, some people see the NHS as a semi-socialist healthcare system within capitalist Britain, so normally, one would conceptualize a country building 36 million low-rent council flats as doing something 'socialistic'. How do you define China's mass public housing programme? Maybe we should just say this is the biggest expansion of public housing in human history and let people decide what category they want to put it into? The problem is that if one says China is capitalist, state capitalist, Keynsian and semi-feudal, it seems to result in a tendency to develop blind spots when looking at reality.
#13 RE: China's princelings of capitalism James Meadway 2012-11-05 18:44
Heiko: really not sure I undertstand the source of your confusion.

China remains a broadly state capitalist economy. It has been led since 1949 by a single party committed to a state capitalist model of development, which it implemented at a immense human cost but which provided the basis on which future economic success could be generated.

The CCP has introduced very substantial elements of the market since 1978ish, in waves of reforms. But - and contrary to a neoliberal mythology about this - the state retains effective control over major sectors and allocation decisions. It is an increasingly hybrid economy, and much of the debate within the CCP now centres on how best to take it forward from here: for or against market-led or plan-led accumulation, for example; for or against greater foreign capital involvement.

Keynesianism here refers to the use of counter-cyclical fiscal policy, which the Chinese ruling class did on a huge scale in the aftermath of the 2008 crash. I don't mean it, as sometimes people do, to incorporate also the features of Western capitalism in the post-war period - substantial welfare states, significant government involvement in economic decisionmaking - although note that it is more useful to think of capitalism existing on a spectrum from more to less state involvement, and on which the classic social democratic economies would've sat somewhere in the middle.
#14 RE: China's princelings of capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-05 19:05
James I accept that this is a more logical position. Which, if one changed your foundation category from "state capitalist" to "transitional society" or "Stalinist" or "bureaucratically planned" would appear to make little difference to method or conclusions.
But I do not accept the use of information about Chinese reality by either James or Sean.
I have listed some of these errors in the article earlier they included:
Wrong assumptions on wages, profit rates, deaths in 1989, numbers living on less than $1 a day, and there are more errors, eg. level of currency reserves (massively underestimated) etc.
If these factual errors inform debate you end up simply defending theoretical frameworks and not investigating if they work or not, when compared to reality.
#15 RE: China's princelings of capitalism sean ledwith 2012-11-05 23:04
Heiko can dispute statistics but we all partly depend on capitalist sources of information such as the ones I have used.

number on a dollar a day

currency reserves

1989 massacre–-23rd-anniversary

A more fundamental problem is that Heiko now seems to argue our view is logical if we stick another label on it-eg 'transitional ' society. This however would be to imply the Chinese elite are benevolently guiding their society towards something else-presumably socialism. The whole point of our view is that this is the last thing the Chinese elite are interested in.

It also massively affects the bottom line in this debate: if you argue China is a transitional society then its current ruling class are to be defended if they encounter conflict from below because they are piloting it towards socialism; if you argue it is a state capitalist regime they are an obstacle that needs to be overthrown. I dont see how anyone on the left can argue in such a scenario we should side with the be-suited apparatchiks who will shortly be parading in the farcical clapping competition in Beijing,

In no way am I telling Heiko that he 'cant call China socialistic'. Obviously there are millions of people who think it is-most of them in the Chinese Communist Party. Telling people what they can and cannot say is the modus operandi of the CCP-telling them for example that the Tiananmen Square massacre is a myth devised by the Western media.
#16 RE: China's princelings of capitalism Heiko Khoo 2012-11-06 01:58
It seems the 150m on $1 a day was right, on this I stand corrected.

The figure for deaths on Tiananmen and in 1989 (which you gave of 30,000) is not backed by the reference you site. It says "hundreds if not thousands" not 30,000.
As for foreign reserves the source you cite says $3tn not $1tn as your article states.
I did not state that you should stick another label on China, I said that there is nothing in the label that you and James are using that provides useful insight.
As for your own labels they seem to flow freely, as you call present-day China both "State Capitalist" and Feudal simultaneously.
As regards proscribing what one could label China as your precise words were "To argue there is anything remotely socialist about modern China is to utterly undermine the credibility of the left as a force for the emancipation of the working class." (I assumed that meant it is out of the bounds of the acceptable.)
However, I never said China is socialist, but I do say there are some elements which are "remotely socialist" and I gave the example of the present programme to build 36 million low cost rental apartments, which I compared to the NHS in Britain which I also think is "remotely socialist".
I hope that this discussion helps to ensure that your future articles take a little more care in their use of formulations and facts.

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